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job tracing the initial statement in 2005 of Hu Jintao’s slightly more flexible
policy towards the island, it does not mention the important change
adopted by the CCP in October 2007, which elevated the priority of the
“peaceful development” of cross-Strait relations (as opposed to “peaceful
reunification”), an idea that goes back to the first point of Beijing’s 17 May
2004 seven-point statement (1) and means that Beijing can accept the status
quo for the time being. It is a policy priority that has not been questioned
by Xi Jinping, even if the new Chinese president has demonstrated more
impatience regarding leaving the issue unresolved for future generations. 
China and Taiwan closes just before the November 2015 Xi-Ma summit
in Singapore and Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
However, it includes all the ingredients that observers need to be aware of
in order to understand the current state and uncertain future of cross-Strait
relations. A tour de force, as we say in English… and in French.
z Jean-Pierre Cabestan is the head of the Department of Government
and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University
(cabestan@hkbu.edu.hk).
1. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America website, “Taiwan Affairs
Office Issues Statement on Current Cross-Straits Relations,” 17 May 2004, www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t111117.htm (accessed on 27 April 2016).
parative context. However, the stylisation of conduct is double-edged: with
the state set as a “principal” controlling its “agents,” it appears disembodied
and monolithic. While the book takes into account the different levels of
the Chinese administration – this selective discipline applying to the central
as well as provincial, municipal, and local levels – it is not quite clear who
at each level acts as the “principal.” Is it the Party secretary? Or is it a larger
leadership, including the divergent interests within it? This is a fundamental
question, as it would help determine the intentionality behind the discipli-
nary actions. This lack of clarity in defining the “principal” thus leads to a
certain imprecision as regards the objectives. For Cai, the state’s aim is to
guarantee its effectiveness as well as its legitimacy among the public. This
legitimacy concept is only vaguely defined, as a sort of moral hegemony of
the state, and it is therefore difficult to grasp its motivations and link them
with the interests of a particular actor. Nevertheless, the numerous cases
and mechanisms detailed in the book facilitate an understanding of what
underlies the selectivity in the state’s discipline.
Two chapters bring detailed focus on the types of undisciplined behaviour
that have grown in the contemporary Chinese state and on the political
logic that explains selective and differentiated discipline. Cai pointedly notes
the large number of violations reported by citizens’ petitions (about 60,000
a year in Guangdong during the 1990s, p. 23) and the vast variety of acts
in question, ranging from abuse of power to corruption, as well as the pur-
suit of irresponsible projects or a lifestyle deemed immoral. The lack of cor-
relation between the number of complaints and the number of cadres
hauled up shows the selectivity of investigations linked to a singular political
logic. Whereas before the 1980s, the Chinese Party-state mainly relied on
major political campaigns to bring its cadres in line, a dedicated mechanism
has since been set up. In the early 2000s, nearly 300,000 cadres were in
charge of internal discipline (p. 49). The model of the Party’s Central Com-
mission for Discipline Inspection, re-established in 1978, was replicated at
the local level. A decentralised system of inspections was then established,
with each level of the administration being in charge of disciplining the next
lower level. In Cai’s view, two main variables are considered in deciding to
punish an agent or not: the seriousness of the consequences and the agent’s
level of responsibility. While this seems self-evident, this approach appears
to be put in doubt by numerous cases that on the contrary point to the ex-
istence of a variety of questions being considered before arriving at a deci-
sion to punish an agent: Has the transgression been made public by the
media? What factional support does the agent enjoy? What effect would
such punishment have on the administration’s image and agents’ morale?…
Thus the agent’s responsibility appears to be a highly malleable element
depending on the result sought by superiors and the information obtained,
or not, by the press, which remains on a tight leash. Power struggles over
defining the objectives of the discipline process are not to be underesti-
mated, while the functional rationality of the state that wants to punish an
agent for his transgression is not to be overestimated, as Cai tends to in the
book.
In the next two chapters, the author plunges into granularity by differen-
tiating the types of transgressions and thus punishments. Focusing at the
outset on professional errors linked to the exercise of a function, as opposed
to cases of corruption, he notes the large panoply of punishments possible,
and the flexibility the state enjoys. By concentrating on cases of social con-
flict management, Cai brings out the complexity of elements at play in judg-
ing a professional error and those responsible. A cadre could well be held
guilty of being responsible for a protest, but if that were not the case, he
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This book by Yongshun Cai, professor at the Hong Kong University of Sci-ence and Technology, is concerned with the ways in which the ChineseParty-state ensures internal discipline. Presenting the issue in the formal
framework of the theory of agency, he stresses the problems of information
asymmetry and moral hazard at the heart of the relationship between the
state and its agents. As the state is not omniscient, it does not always know
what its agents do or will do, and this could lead the latter to adopt behaviours
other than those expected in implementing public policies. In this situation,
the state is obliged to adopt methods for disciplining its agents while taking
into account possible political costs. By targeting its own cadres, the Party-
state risks alienating the main supporters of a regime not based on popular
elections. Keeping this risk in mind, as well as its own limited resources, the
state can hardly afford to attack all its undisciplined cadres and might be
obliged to be selective with rewards and punishments. Thus the state does
not need to punish all violations, but only needs to make agents aware of the
high level of risk they face and to induce fear of this uncertain discipline. 
Major issues regarding the functioning of the Chinese state and its efforts
at formalising the conduct of its actors are considered in this work in a com-
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Noting in the very first chapter that China’s socialist developmentmodel was challenged systematically for its inability to generateprosperity for its people, Pun Ngai proceeds to explain that she felt
compelled to “explore new subjects such as migrant workers” who have
paid the “historic debt” of the new economic development model of the
post-Maoist era centred on labour commodification and exports (p. 17).
While the condition of rural migrant workers remains at the heart of this
work, it should be noted at the outset to what extent the book marks a de-
parture from her previous Made in China, (1) published in 2005, which helps
explain the intellectual path she has traversed since. 
First, while Made in China essentially relied on an ethnographic study of
a specific factory in Shenzhen and sought to show how the subjectivity of
rural migrant workers was constituted, Migrant Labor in China constitutes
the fruits of ten years of work based on several vast research projects that
the author and her team initiated and conducted in China. Among them
was a major study that brought together 20 tertiary institutions from the
People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan conducting more than
3,000 interviews with workers at the Foxconn group following a wave of
suicides in 2010 at several of its factories. 
Second, in Migrant Labor in China, Pun considers both male and female
workers. Moreover, while continuing to focus on the manufacturing industry,
she has over the past five years enlarged her investigation to include the
construction industry and its workers. Pun shows how different institutional
measures and political decisions starting in 1984 allowed the development
of a pyramidal system of subcontracting in which a decoupling occurs be-
tween higher levels of construction project managements (property devel-
opers and construction companies) and the implementation of projects left
to different subcontractors, a system notably leading to numerous instances
of non-payment of wages, the absence of contractual relations between
the worker and the employer, and the impossibility of direct contact be-
tween construction workers and the boss. Pun also shows how this political
economy of the construction sector shapes the ways of protestation – in
general violent and often outside legal avenues (pp. 41-56). As for forms of
contestation in the manufacturing sector, which is tending towards radical-
isation, Pun documents how migrant workers profiting from a process of
long-term accumulation of experience have managed to proactively mo-
bilise in their daily struggles a range of increasingly vast resources, institu-
tional and non-institutional, individual and collective. Globally, in both the
construction and manufacturing industries, different forms of alliances have
could also be accused of having mishandled the event. Besides, the serious-
ness of the event from the state’s viewpoint depends on a variety of factors,
especially the number of protestors, the potential material damage, and the
extent of media coverage. The latter is a key element in the management
of these crises by upper-level authorities. Media pressure on local cadres
can in fact render punishment inevitable despite the high political cost. In
such cases, it is important to convey an appearance of disciplining to the
public, although the decision may be mitigated eventually. There is less
elbow room in corruption cases, and discipline cannot amount to a simple
transfer, for example, but could mean the end of a career and legal proceed-
ings. Cai shows the important role that information transmitted by the pub-
lic to the authorities plays in such cases: between 60% and 80% of the
cases examined by the courts originated from such tips (p. 106). However,
only a small portion of such information leads to an inquiry, as most is not
sufficiently supported or goes against political considerations. This is espe-
cially true with regard to high-level cadres, as proceeding against them re-
quires the discipline inspection commissions to obtain permission from
higher authorities, and a political consensus thus becomes necessary. As a
result, high-level cadres of the Party-state are rarely disturbed. But when
they are, it is with the institution’s full might and with serious charges. As
a result, despite its differentiated treatment of cases, the regime manages
to convey the impression of a certain determination in the anti-corruption
struggle.
Finally, Cai deals with two more original aspects of this selective discipline.
The first is the circumvention techniques of the cadres themselves and what
this implies in terms of tolerance of infringement. Cadres do not remain
mute in the face of the disciplining state. To avoid punishment, some sup-
press information, be it through censoring the press, blocking petitioners,
or manipulating inspection teams. They evade blame by playing off different
levels of administration and by accusing their colleagues. Besides, some use
the relative tolerance of the authorities by playing with the rules in order
to advance local reforms. This aspect highlighted by Cai is interesting, as it
shows that going against the rules can have a positive effect on local gov-
ernance. However, by not differentiating the types of reform and thus the
potential economic and political impact, the analysis remains superficial,
and it is difficult to understand why cadres would take such career risks. 
To bring out these different mechanisms, Cai relies on a vast set of written
material relating to hundreds of cases of transgressions by agents of the
state. While he has occasionally relied on interviews, he gives no details re-
garding the types of people questioned. Overall, Cai’s work offers a good
view of the totality of the Chinese Party-state’s internal discipline mecha-
nism, detailing its institutions and logic. It also rightfully locates the issue
of corruption in a larger framework of state control over its agents, thus
going beyond major campaigns with large media coverage. 
z Translated by N. Jayaram.
z Jérôme Doyon is a PhD candidate in political science at
SciencesPo/CERI (Paris) and Columbia University (New York)
( jd2988@columbia.edu).
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